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DON’T COUNT YOUR NEST EGGS BEFORE THEY VEST: 
A LACK OF REFORM COULD LEAVE A GENERATION 
OF RETIRING ISRAELIS WITHOUT A FUTURE
Tomer Vandsburger†
Abstract: Israel’s pension system has changed drastically since the mid-
1990s, when it faced an underfunding crisis. The transition to defined contribution plans 
permitted a wider range of investments and shifted the burden of income-replacement 
from the government to the individual pension plan participant. This shift required 
increased protections for pension plans, which led to the creation of the Capital Market 
Insurance and Savings Division (CMISD) to oversee and regulate pension management 
entities. In comparison to post-Soviet nations that experienced similar transitions from 
socialist to market economies, Israel’s pension system is significantly healthier and more 
regulated. However, the CMISD must enact measures to oversee the transition of funds 
from “old” to “new” pensions, reduce or eliminate the mandatory 30% investment in 
government bonds, and increase the accountability requirements for pension management 
entities and the organization itself.
I. INTRODUCTION
In unprecedented fashion, the Israeli government has pursued a 
sweeping overhaul of its pension system while simultaneously shifting its 
socialist economy to a free market system. Pension reform came just before 
the nation faced an impending funding crisis, which threatened the financial 
security of an entire generation of Israelis. By releasing its grip on the
pension system, the Israeli government increased the ability of Israelis to 
achieve income-replacement on retirement by permitting outbound 
investments, offering from a greater range of plan options, and introducing
strict pension protections overseen by the Capital Market, Insurance and 
Savings Division (CMISD). Like other nations with well-regulated private 
pension systems, CMISD officials continuously consider potential revisions 
to enhance the profitability, stability, and protection of Israel’s pension 
system.
This comment will review the history of Israeli pension reform,
compare Israel’s progress to several post-Soviet nations that experienced 
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similar economic transformations, review areas in need of further 
consideration, and suggest modifications to the current system. Part II will 
provide a primer on pension systems in order to highlight the prevailing
pension plans that dominated the pre and post-reform era in Israel. Part III
will describe the early history of Israel’s pension system, including the 
struggles that led to its reform, while Part IV will explain how the Israeli 
government reformed the pension system.  Section V will introduce some of 
the more recent additions to Israeli pension programming. Part VI compares 
Israeli pension developments to similar efforts in post-Soviet nations that 
also transitioned from a socialist to a free-market economy and the lessons 
Israel can learn from these nations. Part VII will identify five key areas 
where further refinement to Israeli law is needed. Finally, in Part VIII, this 
comment will briefly conclude.
II. PRIMER ON PENSION SYSTEMS
While pension systems vary greatly in form from one nation to 
another, they share some overarching similarities. These similarities led to 
the development of the “three-legged stool” metaphor for describing 
retirement systems en masse. Each leg represents a different source of 
retirement benefits, and different nations emphasize certain legs depending 
on the economic climate and government system in place. The first leg is 
“government-provided pension and welfare programs for the aged; the 
second is employer or labor union-provided pensions, and the third is direct
individual saving.”1 The first leg serves as a form of “safety net” by 
providing cash and medical insurance, while the second and third legs are 
influenced by tax policies that incentivize specific forms of retirement 
savings.2 Any meaningful pension reform plan will address how wide a 
safety net the government will provide and how it chooses to protect 
employee pensions through employer plans and individual investments.
Pension plans fall into one of two forms: defined benefit or defined 
contribution plans. The plan’s form determines who contributes to the plan, 
when contributions and distributions occur, and how much is contributed 
and eventually distributed. Historically, the defined benefit plan was the 
1 ZVI BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON, PENSION REFORM AND PRIVATIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE: THE CASE OF ISRAEL 2 (1992) (English version on file with the author; Hebrew version 
published in 152  ECON. Q. (Aug. 1992) (Isr.)).
2 Id.
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dominant pension plan form used in countries around the world.3 As the 
name implies, a defined benefit plan specifies an amount the employee will 
receive on retirement, termination, or separation from the employer, often 
based on the employee’s salary and years of service.4 The obligation to fund 
this eventual benefit lies with the employer, who absorbs all investment 
risk.5 Employers distribute benefits from a collective “pension fund,” which
contains an aggregation of pensions held by all employees, providing
employers with a more substantial fund for larger and more diverse 
investments.6 Since the defined benefit plan dictates only the eventual 
payout due to the employee, employers are able to efficiently integrate 
government-funded benefits (for example, social security) and accurately 
predict the amount of investment capital needed annually for distributions.7
Despite the increased predictability afforded by defined benefit plans, 
many nations and employers have moved away from this form
of pension plan. The promise to provide a pre-determined benefit is 
manageable when the employer is financially secure (as it can always cover 
investment losses from other reserves). One of the major issues with defined 
benefit plans, however, is the instability of the employee’s pension when the 
employer is no longer financially viable. This issue was highlighted in the 
United States in 1963 with the Studebaker Incident, which led to the passage 
of the most comprehensive pension protection reform legislation ever 
passed: the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).8 When the 
Studebaker-Packard Corporation closed its doors, it found that it did not 
have sufficient capital in the collective fund to provide the promised benefits 
to all of its employees.9 The company decided to distribute the full defined-
benefits to employees who were age sixty and above (the retirement age), a 
fraction of the entitled benefit amount to some younger employees, and 
nothing at all to a large portion of employees under age sixty.10 This 
incident highlighted a flaw that impacts many defined benefit plan sponsors: 
3 Id. at 4.




7 Id. at 48.
8 James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”:  The Studebaker-
Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 684 (2001). 
9 Id.
10 Id.
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underfunding.11 To avoid situations like the Studebaker Incident, many 
governments incentivized a shift from defined benefit to defined 
contribution plans.
Unlike the defined benefit plan, a defined contribution plan specifies
only the periodic contributions made to an employee’s individual pension 
fund.12 These contributions usually take the form of a fixed percentage of 
employee compensation, which is tax-deferred until eventual distribution.13
The collective pension fund consists of a set of individual employee 
investment accounts.14 On retirement, the employee receives the total value 
of contributions and earnings on investments made to this account.15
Payments take the form of structured annuities, which pay out in regular and 
consistent distributions rather than a lump sum.16 The legal obligation of the 
employer is limited to making the pre-determined periodic contributions to
the employee’s individual fund.17 All investment risk (necessary in order to 
accomplish “income replacement” on retirement) is borne by the 
employee.18 Since the value of benefits in a defined contribution plan is 
equal to the value of the assets in the fund, the plan is always fully funded.19
Understanding the life cycle of a nation’s pension reform process 
requires considering the influence of reigning economic philosophies on the 
use of defined benefit plans, “focusing events”—such as the underfunding 
crisis in the Studebaker Incident—that encourage a shift to defined 
contribution plans, and modern statutory provisions that demonstrate the 
extent to which a complete pension system transformation has occurred.
The likelihood of a nation undertaking comprehensive reform is heavily 
influenced by its own experience with focusing events, which demonstrate 
the need to engage in strict regulation and protection of pension funds.20
The desire to avoid similar crises in the future encourages governments to 
adopt regulatory procedures, which may result in additional costs to 
government agencies and management fees paid by pensioners.
11 Id. at 685.
12 LANGBEIN, PRATT & STABILE, supra note 4, at 48.
13 Id.
14 BODIE & MERTON, supra note 1, at 4.
15 Id.
16 LANGBEIN, PRATT & STABILE, supra note 4, at 48.
17 BODIE & MERTON, supra note 1, at 4.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See Wooten, supra note 8, at 726–36.
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III. EARLY HISTORY OF ISRAEL’S PENSION SYSTEM
As with former Soviet Bloc nations in the 1990s, Israel underwent a 
transition from a centrally planned, nationalized economic system to a 
capitalist system of free markets and private ownership.21 Though Israel’s 
political history varied significantly from these post-Soviet nations, its 
government had exercised near total control over banking and pension 
systems, restricted outbound capital transactions, and overseen almost all 
household savings.22 Much like the gradual pace of its economic 
transformation, Israel implemented reforms to its government-run pension 
system and privatized many of its state-owned enterprises incrementally.23
For much of Israel’s pension system history, the vast majority of
pension plans were defined benefit plans.24 While these plans still promised 
to provide a set benefit upon retirement, they were either partially funded or 
completely unfunded government plans.25 This meant there was no reserve 
fund set aside exclusively for the purpose of distributing retirement 
benefits. While this freed up significant amounts of capital, it also led to 
payment in full of Israeli employees who retired early.26 These distributions 
were made without concern about the level of funding remaining for 
younger workers still decades away from retirement, creating a risk of future 
plan insolvency.27 The lack of a “focusing event” until the late 1990s meant 
there was little incentive for Israel to move away from this risky pension 
strategy and little concern that the government would ever need to trim 
benefits.28
Israel’s overarching labor union association, Histadrut, managed 
roughly half of the nation’s defined benefit plans through several funds for 
different types of workers.29 Almost 95% of employee and employer 
contributions were invested in special “index-linked” bonds issued by the 
Israeli government that guaranteed a real interest rate higher than rates 
provided by bonds on the free market.30 The Israeli government limited 
21 BODIE & MERTON, supra note 1, at 1.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Avia Spivak & Rita Troitsky, Pension Reform in Israel, 2 PUB. & MUN. FIN. 26, 27 (2013). 
25 BODIE & MERTON, supra note 1, at 9.
26 Id. at 9–10.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Spivak & Troitsky, supra note 24, at 30.
30 BODIE & MERTON, supra note 1, at 12.
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investment in these special bonds to defined benefit plans, making it harder 
for defined contribution plans to overcome the gap between promised 
benefits and existing funds, known in Israel as an actuarial deficit.31 This 
did little to address underfunding concerns for defined benefit plans, but did 
hinder defined contribution plan participants from achieving income 
replacement. Fears of an impending crisis were made worse by a series of 
government statements that bonds issued to defined benefit plans would no 
longer provide special interest rates.32
In their seminal analysis of Israel’s impending pension crisis, 
economists Zvi Bodie and Robert C. Merton identified three issues that 
prevented reform to Israel’s pension system in the early 1990s.33 Each of 
these issues represented a fundamental conflict between what reforms would 
most directly benefit the health of the pension system, and what values were 
desired by the still largely socialist nature of Israel’s government and 
economic system. 
The first issue was that Israeli pension plans could not achieve income 
replacement or necessary diversification because the Israeli government 
limited plan investment to securities issued by Israeli firms.34 By preventing
Israelis from investing their retirement funds globally, the Israeli 
government denied employees and employers the chance to reduce the 
actuarial deficit by investing in more profitable securities while hedging the 
increased risk involved by creating a diversified portfolio, including more 
stable government bonds.35 Few Israeli legislators supported diversification 
through outbound investment because it flew in the face of two aspects of
Israel’s economic philosophy: limiting capital outflows and continued
government oversight of the pension system.36 Permitting pension funds to 
invest internationally caused concerns because it meant the Israeli 
government was tacitly approving the outbound flight of capital, rather than 
investing in the still-young Israeli state, and placing such outbound capital 
investments beyond the reach of government regulation.37
31 Spivak & Troitsky, supra note 24, at 30.
32 BODIE & MERTON, supra note 1, at 11.
33 Id. at 10–12.
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Second, the Israeli government mandated participation in the pension 
system, specifically through defined benefit plans.38 The justification for 
requiring all workers to divert some of their compensation toward their 
pension was based on the idea that by doing so the government would not 
need to compensate “free-riders” who reach retirement age without any 
savings.39 Most nations require employees to contribute at a minimum
annual level, but up through the 1990s the mandatory participation 
requirements in Israel were used more as a means to restrict the level of 
investment risk undertaken by plan sponsors than as a “safety net.”40
Concerned that Israeli investors would lose outbound investments and then 
rely on government-provided benefits, the Israeli government created these 
mandatory minimum participation requirements and restricted defined 
contribution investments to Israeli securities.41 These limitations seemed 
reasonable given Israel’s paternalistic approach to economic regulation, but 
became a point of concern upon realizing that the government pension 
system was entirely unfunded. As a result, these mandatory minimum 
participation amounts could only guarantee the minimum level of benefits at 
times when employee retirement and national economic stability coincided.
Finally, by limiting investment to government-sponsored bonds, 
which were indexed to cost-of-living, Israelis were unable to invest in a way 
that reflected “standard of living” values.42 These bonds were adjusted to 
approximate cost of living changes in a manner that ensured all retirees 
could afford basic necessities following retirement.43 By restricting 
diversification and investment for pension plans, the Israeli government 
made it impossible to retire at the same standard of living that citizens 
experienced throughout their years of employment. This fit the Israeli 
socialist ideal that influenced pension policy for much of the nation’s 
history, but left countless Israelis reliant on the government’s “safety net,” 
which, again, was unfunded. By not opening investment to securities that 
could match the standard of living, the Israeli government passed on the 
opportunity to ensure that only those who truly needed it would turn to the 
safety net.




42 Id. at 12.
43 Id.
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IV. REFORMS TO ISRAEL’S PENSION SYSTEM
Growing actuarial deficits through the early 1990s finally forced 
Israeli government officials to recognize that the existing system was 
unsustainable. Government Resolution 5156, passed in March of 1995, 
outlined how the government would address actuarial deficits on existing 
defined benefit plans and transition newly-created plans to a more 
sustainable model.44 Part C of the resolution closed off access to these “old 
pensions” and restricted newly created plans to defined contribution 
plans.45 As part of this resolution, the Israeli government promised to insure
all benefits promised to existing old pensions, but the Israeli High Court of 
Justice ruled in five separate constitutional challenges to the resolution that 
this promise was little more than a goal, without any binding guarantee.46
These rulings permitted years of inactivity, and it was not until 2002 that the 
Knesset (Israel’s primary legislative body) took binding steps to protect the 
old pension funds.47 By this time the total actuarial deficit had reached NIS 
109 billion, approximately USD 27.5 billion based on the current exchange 
rate between New Israeli Shekel and American Dollars.48 The realization 
that the deficit had reached this astonishing level would serve as Israel’s 
“focusing event” that prompted reform.49 Interestingly, Israel was able to 
act early enough to avoid a crisis like the Studebaker Incident.
The 2002 measures to implement the policies of the 1995 Resolution 
addressed the growing deficits by shifting plan responsibility to participants, 
thereby limiting the government’s liability. The government committed to 
funding NIS 80 billion over a period of thirty-five years, with the remaining 
deficit shifted to plan participants.50 The retirement age was raised from 
sixty-five to sixty-seven for men and from sixty to sixty-four for women, 
and at the same time the required contribution rate was 20.5% annually of 
participants’ salaries51 Further, the financial responsibility for the funds was 
44 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., ISRAEL: REVIEW OF THE PRIVATE PENSIONS SYSTEM,
18 (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter OECD REVIEW].
45 Knesset Res. 5156, Part C (Mar. 29, 1995).
46 ISRAELI MINISTRY OF FIN., PENSION SYSTEM: ANNUAL REPORT 2000, 31–32 (2000) [hereinafter 
ANNUAL REPORT 2000]. See, e.g., Prof. Shmuel Kaniel et al v. Government of Israel, HCJ 3975/99 (1999) 
(“The Government resolution does not have the effect of creating a guarantee, tantamount to a binding legal 
undertaking by the state, to meet the liabilities of pension funds to their members . . . .”).
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shifted to the plan members, while fund management was delegated to 
professional managers who collected pension management fees.52 The 
resolution also permitted an increase or decrease of promised pension 
benefits should the cumulative actuarial gain or loss exceed 5% of the pre-
determined benefit.53 The resolution simultaneously placed the burden of 
diminished benefits on plan members, while authorizing the creation of 
defined contribution plans for transitioning old plan members and new 
members.
Government Resolution 5156 laid the foundation for a more 
sustainable pension system by creating “new pension plans,” which 
functioned exclusively as defined contribution plans.54 Beginning in 
January of 1995, workers were able to establish these new pensions through 
either collective-bargaining agreements or, unlike with old pensions, on an 
individual basis.55 Resolution 5156’s cap on government contributions did
not limit the benefits provided by these plans and the 5% adjustment 
benchmark ensured that each new pension plan was fully funded.56 These 
plans pay out in an amount based on total contributions and investment 
return, reduced only by fees paid to the management company.57 A
minimum level (typically defined as a percentage) of benefits (as determined 
by the management company) must be paid in the form of a structured 
annuity, with the remainder paid either periodically or in a lump sum.58
While this resolution paved the way to effectuating many of the 
reforms Bodie and Merton outlined in 1995,59 it also gave rise to the need
for strict regulation of defined contribution plan management akin to the 
United States’ aforementioned ERISA statute. After years of legislative 
gridlock, the Knesset passed these much needed regulations with the Control 
of Financial Services (Insurance) Law (CFSIL), 5741-1981, which included 
the creation of the CMISD within the Israeli Ministry of Finance.60 CFSIL
empowered the Commissioner of the CMISD to “give, modify and withdraw 
52 Id.
53 OECD REVIEW, supra note 44, at 19.
54 ANNUAL REPORT 2000, supra note 46, at 4.
55 OECD REVIEW, supra note 44, at 19.
56 Knesset Res. 5156 (Mar. 29, 1995).
57 OECD REVIEW, supra note 44, at 19.
58 Id.
59 BODIE & MERTON, supra note 1, at 11–13.
60 Control of Financial Services (Insurance) Law, 5741-1961, § 2(a), 5.
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an insurer’s license,”61 as well as “issue instructions about the way insurers 
and insurance agents, their officers and their employees shall operate and be 
managed, all in order to assure their orderly operation and the protection of 
the interests of insured persons or of clients, and in order to prevent any 
detraction from an insurer's ability to meet his obligations.”62 Should the 
plan management insurance entity disagree with the Commissioner’s 
decision to deny or revoke a license, CFSIL grants the right to an appeal 
reviewed by both the Commissioner and the CMISD’s Consulting 
Committee.63
Regulation of plan management insurance entities was furthered by 
passage of the Insurance Control Law (ICL), which sought to increase 
accountability of the governing boards of these entities.64 This amendment 
to the original pension system reform required external membership of the 
governing boards.65 At least one-third of the board members must be 
external directors, and at least half of these external directors need
“experience or specialization in the area of pension activity or at similar 
financial bodies.”66 These requirements serve to ensure that management 
entities will promote the interests of plan beneficiaries rather than the
interests of shareholders to whom these private entities are ultimately 
accountable.
In addition to granting regulatory power to CMISD, CFSIL also 
defines the fiduciary responsibilities of insurance entities, investment 
limitations, contribution rates, financial reporting requirements, tax 
treatment of deferred income, and adjustment of benefits based on actuarial 
deficits and surpluses.67 It also authorizes the Commissioner to issue 
circulars that have binding legislative effect.68 The law further requires 
public notice in Reshumot—the Israeli government’s publication of official 
records and laws—that a new circular has been issued and the date it enters 
into effect.69 The Commissioner is also held accountable for his or her 
management of the CMISD, as CFSIL establishes provisions to authorize his 
61 OECD REVIEW, supra note 44, at 11.
62 Control of Financial Services (Insurance) Law, 5741-1961, § 2(b), 5.
63 Id. § 102(a)–(c), 58.
64 Control of Financial Services (Insurance) Law, 5741-1961 (as amended).
65 Id.
66 OECD REVIEW, supra note 44, at 13.
67 Id. at 11.
68 Control of Financial Services (Insurance) Law, 5741-1961, § 111A(a)–(b), 63.
69 Id.
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or her removal from office (as well as that of any commission or council 
member).70
Government Resolution 5156 and the CFSIL comprehensively 
overhauled an underfunded system that seemed headed toward disaster 
(especially in light of the sharp increase in the number of Israelis retiring and 
claiming benefits in the late 1990s and early 2000s). In mimicking many of 
the protections afforded by ERISA, CFSIL has transformed Israel’s pension 
system from a decaying monument to socialist economic policies, to one that 
is better equipped to meet the demands of Israel’s rapid economic 
privatization.
V. MODERN PENSION SYSTEM DEVELOPMENTS
More recently, several amendments to CFSIL have adapted Israeli 
pension law to reflect changes in market demands and acknowledge 
regulatory necessities.71 In particular, three forms of new pension funds 
were developed to offer a better range of investment options for defined 
contribution plan participants.72 New “General Pension Funds” were 
authorized by the Commissioner of the CMISD through instructions issued 
on July 8, 1997, allowing participants to acquire only old-age pensions.73
This permitted investors to pass on disability insurance and survivors’ 
pensions, thereby choosing to receive pension benefits only on retirement 
rather than on the occurrence of these contingencies.74 The general pension 
funds are the only funds that permit one-time deposits to be made, and as a 
result, they tend to be attractive to highly compensated savers.75
Second, the Control of Financial Services (Provident Funds) Law
(CFSPFL), 5765–2005, authorized the use of “Provident Funds,” which 
serve as a hybrid of new pensions and general pension funds.76 Like general 
pension funds, these provident funds function as savings instruments without 
any insurance coverage.77 They do not, however, permit “one-time” 
contributions, so they are not as attractive to highly compensated workers.
70 Id. at § 9, 7.




74 OECD REVIEW, supra note 44, at 20.
75 Id.
76 Control of Financial Services (Provident Funds) Law, 5765-2005, § 16(a), 14.
77 Id.
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Similar to new pension plans, provident fund benefits can only be withdrawn 
when the member reaches the age of sixty (the age is subject to modification 
by the CMISD Commissioner or the Knesset), and the minimum payment 
must be made in the form of a periodic annuity in the amount of NIS 
3,850.78 As with the new pension plans, any benefits beyond the designated 
annuity amount can be withdrawn in the form of a lump sum.79 Unlike the 
new pension plans, participants in provident funds may not invest in 
government bonds that produce “relatively high and stable rates of 
investment return,” thus limiting the popularity of this type of fund.80
Finally, Israelis can also invest in traditional life insurance policies 
that may or may not be covered by the regulations of CFSIL. If the saver 
chooses to invest in a pure life insurance program, then the disbursement of 
savings is limited to either death or loss of earning capacity. These plans are 
covered by legislation that addresses life insurance plans, not pension laws.81
However, if the saver chooses to invest in a life insurance plan that splits 
contributions between insurance coverage and a savings component, the 
savings component is covered by CFSIL’s strict coverage regulations.82
While these new plan options expanded how workers could invest for 
their retirement, employers were explicitly precluded from denying pension 
coverage to employees beginning in 2008.83 The Minister of Industry, 
Trade, and Labor signed an order that codified an agreement between the 
Histadrut and Coordination Office of the Economic Organizations, requiring 
that every salaried worker receive a pension.84 This mandatory pension 
agreement covered those workers who were not already protected by the 
pensions provided for by collective bargaining agreements. The order 
authorizing these plans stipulated a contribution rate that exceeded new 
pensions (approximately 7% contribution by employee and 7.5% by 
employer as opposed to 5% and 6% respectively for new pensions), and 
permitted investment in a new pension, provident fund, or a life insurance 
policy.85
78 OECD REVIEW, supra note 44, at 21.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 21–22.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 22.
84 OECD REVIEW, supra note 44, at 22.
85 Id.
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Lastly, in addition to this expansive reform of the nation’s private 
pension system, Israel established its public pension system to serve as a 
safety net under the National Insurance Law.86 This law (passed in 1953)
authorized the creation of the National Insurance Institute, which provides 
benefits on attainment of the qualifying age (as amended, currently sixty-
seven for men and sixty-four for women).87 The National Insurance Institute 
requires all workers to “pay-as-you-go,” where each employee contributes to 
the system regardless of whether or not they will eventually come to rely on 
it.88 In order to obtain benefits through the public pension system, recipients 
must be an Israeli resident, have paid insurance fees as required, and pay the 
fixed-rate contribution.89 This includes an annual payment of NIS 141 for 
non-working individuals until the retirement age.90 Every retired Israeli is 
entitled to an annual payment of approximately 30% of the average wage in 
the economy, including those who are sufficiently insured through private 
pension plans.91
These modern amendments to earlier pension system reforms have 
successfully afforded more options to pension plan participants, while also 
improving the stability of a previously overburdened system. The               
mandatory pension requirements ensure that all workers are provided for on 
retirement, regardless of their field of employment. Meanwhile, the “safety 
net” provided by the public pension system serves as a meaningful fallback 
provision for those who experience investment losses through defined 
contribution plans, or simply do not work at all. Still, some lingering 
provisions, as well as an absence of certain provisions, recall Israel’s former 
socialist ideologies, inhibiting the effectiveness of CFSIL.92
VI. COMPARING ISRAEL’S REFORMS TO SIMILAR EFFORTS IN POST-SOVIET 
NATIONS
While Israel’s economic privatization occurred at a slower, more 
evolutionary pace, the post-Soviet republics had a market economy thrust 
upon them in the early 1990s. Undoubtedly, this is one reason why post-
Soviet nations could not adopt the incremental approach to pension system 
86 See generally Amendment to the National Insurance Law, 5755-1995, 208 (5773–2013). 
87 Id.
88 OECD REVIEW, supra note 44, at 15.
89 Id.
90 Amendment to the National Insurance Law, 5755-1995, (Section 5), 208 (5773–2013).
91 OECD REVIEW, supra note 44, at 16.
92 See infra Part VI.
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reform that Israel used. For example, while Israel maintained a “fully 
funded” defined benefit pension system for years after economic 
privatization, post-Soviet nations quickly adopted pay-as-you-go systems 
(where current workers subsidized the pensions of retirees).93 Another 
divergence is that many post-Soviet nations are still plagued by low 
participation rates,94 while Israeli participation rates are high by comparison. 
Despite these differences, both Israeli and post-Soviet pension systems 
continue to face three key issues that impede their development years after 
economic privatization: lack of programming to address rapidly aging 
populations, low pension levels, and a reluctance to fully adapt pension 
systems to the demands of a market-economy.
This section will conduct a historical analysis of pension system 
reform in post-Soviet nations, focusing on Ukraine, Georgia, the regions of 
the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and Russia. By comparing Israel’s 
pension system to systems in post-Soviet nations, the Knesset can gain
insight into potential changes it could adopt that have already been 
successfully implemented in post-Soviet nations. More importantly,
however, the struggles faced by post-Soviet nations serve to highlight 
changes that should be avoided by Israeli legislators. Most pressingly, some 
of these struggles must serve as a warning to advocates regarding the status 
quo for Israel’s pension system and the need for further modifications.
A. Post-Soviet Pension Reform: Ukraine
Ukraine’s pension system initially developed as a publicly run pay-as-
you-go system, and officials in Ukraine, like policymakers in Israel for 
decades after declaring political independence, were extremely reluctant to 
adapt their system to suit the demands of a market economy.95 Under a pay-
as-you-go system, the health of the pension system, as it pertains to 
distributions to current retirees, is based almost entirely on contributions 
made into the system by current workers through payroll taxes.96 Not 
surprisingly, such a system’s functionality depends entirely on the economic 
93 See generally ANTON DOBRONOGOV & LES MAYHEW, INT’L INST. FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS 
ANALYSIS, INTERIM REPORT: PENSION REFORM IN A HIGHLY INFORMALIZED POST-SOVIET ECONOMY
(1990).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 6.
96 Mitchell A. Orenstein, The New Pension Reforms: Lessons from Post-Soviet Republics, in
FIGHTING POVERTY & REFORMING SOCIAL SECURITY: WHAT CAN POST-SOVIET STATES LEARN FROM THE 
NEW DEMOCRACIES IN CENTRAL Europe 87, 88 (Michael Cain, Nida Gelaziz & Tomasz Inglot eds., 2005).
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health of the nation, and during periods of economic upheaval both
Ukrainian workers (who faced layoffs and delayed wages) and pensioners 
were unable to maintain an adequate daily income.97 On average, economic 
downturns in the 1990s resulted in payment delays that in turn caused non-
payments in the amount of 1.31 million Hryvnias, or 1.3% of the total 
pension fund.98 The cumulative impact of these non-payments on the 
livelihood of individual pensioners was stunning.
A survey conducted ten years following Ukrainian independence 
found that the average monthly pension was only 70 Hryvnias, 
approximately USD 13 dollars a month, which fell well below the poverty 
line of 90.7 Hryvnias and just above the monthly cost of food at 69.6 
Hryvnias.99 These limited pensions became more meager as Ukraine’s 
economic struggles continued unabated throughout the 1990s.100 In 1981, 
the percentage of Ukrainians earning and contributing less than USD 4.30 
per day to the pension system was among the highest in the Soviet Union at 
86%. By 1993, only 14% of Ukrainians earned below this minimal amount,
which was the lowest rate among post-Soviet nations.101 However, economic 
instability derailed these improvements and by 1996 the rate of Ukrainians 
earning less than USD 4.30 per day was 46%, and by 1999 that number was 
66%.102 Smaller earnings meant lower pay-as-you-go contributions.
Compounding the negative effect of declining wages on the public 
pension system, private employers further gutted this system by re-
classifying their workers as “informal” workers to avoid paying payroll 
taxes.103 Also, workers who saw older Ukrainians receiving extremely small 
pensions saw little benefit in contributing to the pay-as-you-go-system.104 In
response to this reality, many working-age Ukrainians found ways to evade 
the social security tax in order to keep their wages.105 For decades, 
Ukrainian politicians held onto the collective pension system even though 
the system lacked any kind of savings or investment mechanisms.106 The 
97 DOBRONOGOV & MAYHEW, supra note 93, at 6.
98 Id.
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FORMER SOVIET UNION 4 (2009).
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106 Economic Reforms in Ukraine: Pension Reform, UKRAINIAN ECON. REFORM FUND, http://uerf.org/
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limited reforms that did take place established different distribution rates for 
different types of employment, effectively granting greater pensions to 
certain classes of workers at the expense of roughly 80% of the working 
population who derived their pensions from the same limited fund.107
By 2011, the Ukrainian government was forced to choose between 
implementing dramatic pension reforms and facing catastrophic 
consequences.108 Pensioners faced a declining standard of living, employers 
increasingly informalized the workforce to avoid payroll taxes, and 
intergenerational tensions increased as pensioners felt that working age 
Ukrainians abandoned them entirely.109 Finally, on September 9, 2011, 
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych codified the Law of Ukraine “On 
the Measures of Legislative Enactment of Pension System Reform,” which 
replaced the state-run pay-as-you-go system with a three-tier hybrid.110 The 
three-tiered system that became effective in late 2011 represents a
combination of the existing system, a state-funded insurance system, and a 
privatized defined contribution system.111
The first-tier, a newly minted pay-as-you-go system, was not one 
pension fits all; instead, the pension size was tied to the size of the retiree’s 
working salary and duration of insured service.112 The second-tier consisted 
of mandatory state-funded pension insurance, which protected pensioners 
against economic swings by shifting the payment burden away from 
working Ukrainians to the Ukrainian government itself.113 Finally, the third-
tier was completely privatized and optional, a pension fund in which higher-
earning Ukrainians could invest their funds in private securities in order to 
achieve income replacement on retirement.114 Ukraine’s new pension 
system law provides limited guidance regarding oversight or regulation of 
economic-reforms-in-ukraine/pension-reform/ (last visited Feb. 28, 3016) [hereinafter Economic Reforms 
in Ukraine].
107 Int’l Org. of Pension Supervisors, Ukraine: Pension System’s Key Characteristics, at 3 (2009) 
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108 DUBRONOGOV & MAYHEW, supra note 93, at 9. 
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these private pensions,115 but does provide a government-guaranteed 
fallback option that provides pensions for old age, disability, and surviving 
spouses.116
B. Post-Soviet Pension Reform: Georgia
Georgia’s pension system faced many of the same struggles as 
Ukraine in the 1990s that eventually resulted in pension reform.117 The 
system faced a shrinking contribution base due to the rise in informal 
employment, political upheaval that led to economic uncertainty, and, as a 
result, extremely low benefits payments that forced many Georgians into 
extreme poverty.118 The percentage of Georgians who earned a daily
working wage of USD 4.30 rose dramatically from 32% in 1981 to 71% in 
2005.119 These improvements in daily wages meant greater pay-as-you-go
contributions, but wages hardly rose to the levels needed for a healthy 
pension system. As early as 1999, the Georgian legislature began to 
consider adopting the exact same three-tier system that was established in 
Ukraine over a decade later.120 For a variety of reasons, however, this 
proposal languished and failed to pass through the Georgian legislature.121
From 2004 to 2008, the Georgian government adopted a number of 
reforms addressing the failings of the public pension system.122 Through the 
2005 Act on State Pensions, all Georgians were given the right to old age 
pensions, which would be subsidized by a 25% tax on all gross-profits for 
individual workers.123 These flat pension payments reached as high as 70 
Georgian Lari (GEL) per month, or USD 31.25, by 2008.124 Government 
officials were still reluctant, however, to consider adding a privatized 
pension system.125 These officials feared that by incentivizing retirement 
saving, individuals would have less money to spend on Georgian consumer
115 See Chadbourne & Park LLP, supra note 110, at 2.
116 See IOPS, Review of Ukraine, supra note 107, at 4.
117 ALEXI GUGUSHVILI, THE (NON) REFORM OF THE GEORGIAN PENSION SYSTEM, 1991–2011: A
BRIEF HISTORY AND UPDATE 2 (2012).
118 Id.
119 SLAY, supra note 100, at 4.
120 GUGUSHVILI, supra note 117, at 3.
121 Id. at 3–4 (noting the corruption in the pension system, concerns over growing budget deficits, and 
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goods.126 Georgian politicians only seriously considered pension reform 
when the 2008 global financial crisis depleted its reserves, and it could no 
longer fund its state-run pension system.127
In the face of economic collapse, Georgia became reliant on 
international lending and investment by both foreign nations and
international organizations. These lenders began to heavily influence 
pension policy, using their investments as leverage to goad Georgian leaders 
into supporting greater privatization of the pension system.128 One such 
group, the Pension Review Group, directly proposed amendments to the 
Law on Non-State Pension Insurance and Provision that would allow private 
pension funds to diversify their investments beyond the scope of Georgian 
borders.129 Despite these significant shifts, much of the current conversation 
surrounds two key issues: 1) whether Georgia’s state-run pension system 
provides the 100 GEL monthly payment that politicians have promised since 
2011; and 2) whether a mandatory pension system is in the best interests of 
Georgian citizens.130
C. Post-Soviet Pension Reform: South Caucasus Region and Central 
Asia
Post-Soviet nations in the South Caucasus Region and Central Asia 
represent the most economically troubled nations following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union.131 The people of the South Caucasus nations of Armenia 
and Azerbaijan consistently earned daily wages of USD 4.30 at rates of 
approximately 73% and 85% respectively throughout the 1990s.132 The 
Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan faced rates ranging from 24% to 99% at various points in the 
1990s.133 These low daily wages made the task of funding the generous 
Soviet pension system impossible. This underfunding crisis was the 
focusing event that led these nations to become the first to completely 
overhaul their pension systems in the post-Soviet era.
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Governing officials throughout these regions began to propose 
reforms that would ease the government’s burden of funding defined benefit 
plans by authorizing defined contribution plans instead, moving from a pay-
as-you-go government-run pension to a funded fallback system and shifting
investment risk to individuals by permitting privatized retirement 
investment.134 In many ways, these nations were the most likely among 
post-Soviet nations to seriously consider privatizing their pension systems 
because adjustment to revenue collection mechanisms could not reasonably 
meet pensioners’ needs.135 These nations were also quick adopters of 
pension reform because they faced factors that made pension reform 
extremely necessary: an aging population that would need income 
replacement in short order, rising poverty that reduced fund contributions 
and increased incentives to evade contribution requirements, a growing 
inequality gap between private industry leaders and the vast majority of 
workers, and growing unemployment due to disruptive economic swings 
during the 1990s and early 2000s.136
With the stage set for reform, nations in these regions approached the 
reform process in unique ways. Two nations in particular demonstrate the 
wide range reforms can take: Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Kazakhstan was 
forced into a position of reform when its state-run system began benefiting 
an unsustainable 83 pensioners for every 100 contributors.137 The Law on
Pension Provision in the Republic of Kazakhstan was passed in 1997, and 
had the effect of transforming the pay-as-you-go system into a series of fully 
funded, individual, defined contribution accounts.138 The Kazakh 
government enacted a transitional period for retirees leaving the workforce 
in the years following the new legislation, and eventually adopted a 
universal minimum pension system that provided 3,000 Tenge a month, 
approximately USD 16.15, to support those who did not have private 
pension savings.139
134 JANE FALKINGHAM & ATHINA VLACHANTONI, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON CENTER FOR 
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In contrast to Kazakhstan’s denouncement of most state-run elements 
of its pension system, Tajikistan in many ways reinforced state-run elements 
of its system.140 The Tajik government has maintained a social insurance 
old-age pension, with benefit amounts based on average earnings and years 
of service.141 Nearly 85% of elderly Tajik citizens receive a benefit in the 
amount of 56 Somoni a month, or USD 30, but nearly 20% of those 
recipients are also dependent on support of family members living in 
Tajikistan and abroad.142 The need to support a rapidly aging Tajik 
population has led nearly 26% of younger Tajik citizens to leave their 
children in the hands of their own parents and seek work beyond Tajik 
borders.143 While the lack of reform in Tajikistan has allowed the Tajik 
government to avoid enacting complex regulatory regimes, a large portion of 
Tajik citizens have had to shoulder the financial burden of providing for 
older family members because the Tajik government has failed to enact 
pension reform.
D. Post-Soviet Pension Reform: Russia
Despite experiencing greater economic growth relative to many other 
post-Soviet nations, Russia experienced many of the same problems that 
stimulated pension reform across the region. In 1950, there were ten 
workers for every pensioner, but by 1995, that number declined to six and 
was projected to decline even further under the existing system.144 Though
the percentage of Russians earning less than USD 4.30 daily had declined to 
19% by 2005 (third only behind Ukraine and Belarus),145 the emigration of 
Russian citizens reduced the revenue required to maintain a state-run 
pension system at promised benefit levels.146 The most pertinent period in 
Russia’s pension transformation coincided with Vladimir Putin’s first term 
as President of the Russian Federation. Beginning in 2000, Putin and his 
ministers sought to transform the lingering state-run aspects of Russia’s 
140 Id. at 36–37.
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economy into a free market system, modernize Russia’s economy, and 
reduce poverty.147
The most impactful Russian pension reform law was enacted in 2001, 
and adopted a three-tiered system similar to Ukraine’s.148 The first tier 
consisted of the country’s mandatory pension system, in which a 28% of 
wages fee was imposed on all earnings and half of this amount was paid to 
pensioners out of a state-run fund.149 The second tier consisted of the other 
half of the collected fees, which were allocated to each worker’s individual 
fund.150 Finally, the third tier was merely a subset of the second tier, as 
workers could take their individual fund allocations and invest their fund 
amounts in government bonds or private securities.151 The model was 
essentially the same system that has been adopted by nations around the 
world, but the faults of the Russian system were exposed far more swiftly 
than in other systems.
First, minimal attention was given to how individuals, private entities, 
and government actors would transition from the Soviet-style pay-as-you-go
system to the three-tiered system.152 Second, it was unclear who was 
charged with regulating the privatized portion of the system, and in turn, to 
whom this regulatory agency was accountable.153 Third, the Russian 
government entirely failed to educate its citizens about the new pension 
system.154 By 2002, nearly 93.2% of all workers kept their pension savings 
in the state-run system (which invested entirely in government bonds) rather 
than transitioning their funds into private investments.155
As the Russian government attempted to address some of these 
shortcomings, other problems emerged in their place. State agencies 
charged with administrating the pension system were frequently found to be 
corrupt and ineffective.156 Beginning in 2004, however, a series of 
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amendments passed in the Russian Duma that helped solve the early 
struggles of the Russian pension system.157 A 2004 resolution created the 
Pension Fund and regional Department of Social Protection offices in order 
to monitor the health and legitimacy of the pension system.158 A transition 
program was also proposed to oversee the change from a purely state-run 
system to a largely privatized system, though the Russian populace rejected 
this program.159
The results of Russia’s reforms have demonstrated some of the 
struggles that many post-Soviet nations have faced in transitioning from a 
state-run model to a private pension system. The proportion of voluntary 
pension funds to mandatory pension savings has declined steadily from 2005 
to 2012.160 This can be explained in two ways: 1) a continued lack of 
education on private pension savings inhibits Russian workers from moving 
their pensions to higher-yield individual defined contribution funds; and 2) 
Russian law caps investment in most private securities but does not cap 
investment in government bonds.161 Some private pensions are so restricted
that absolutely no foreign investment is permitted.162 Russia, like other post-
Soviet nations, has dramatically overhauled its pay-as-you-go system, but 
has failed in many ways to refine its pension system enough to make it fully 
functional for the entirety of Russian citizenry.
E. Pension Reform Trends Across Post-Soviet Nations and Lessons for 
Israel’s Knesset
Like many nations around the world, post-Soviet nations have 
struggled to modernize and privatize their pension systems in tandem with 
economic shifts from socialist to free-market systems. While the successes 
for these post-Soviet pension systems are few, there are relevant positive and 
negative lessons that Israel can learn from these post-Soviet pension 
systems. There are three trends worthy of observation: 1) the process of 
privatizing pensions is slow, arduous, and requires a commitment to refining 
the very specific flaws of larger reforms; 2) pension reforms require 
consideration of communal and social impacts that might not be considered 
157 Id.
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in a purely economic analysis; and 3) a successful reform requires 
commitment either to state-oversight or individual accountability and 
assumption of risk, while the inability to commit does a disservice to 
pensioners.
As evidenced by the experiences of post-Soviet nations, even 
comprehensive legislative reform does not guarantee that the transition from 
a state-run to a privatized pension system will come to fruition in practice.
As was the case in Ukraine and Russia, the adoption of a three-tiered system 
fits the mold created by many nations with long histories of free-market 
economies, but a one-size-fits-all pension system approach cannot work 
without accounting for the economic history of post-Soviet nations.163 For 
example, employers have few incentives to maintain a formal workforce 
when the pension system continues to rely on payroll taxes as a source of 
revenue without a regulatory watchdog, thus leading to massive 
informalization of workforces throughout post-Soviet nations to circumvent 
employer payroll taxes.164 In addition, blanket promises to increase the 
guaranteed minimum stipend, as is the case in Georgia, often cannot be 
realized without modifying the revenue collection mechanism.165 To fully 
see through the promised reforms in these nations, politicians need to 
dedicate significant political capital to adopt the programs necessary to 
transition to a free-market system and resist caving into political pressures to 
return to state-run roots.
While politicians need to consider the finer reforms that address the 
minute details that make a pension system work, they also need to consider 
the human cost of pension reform. By continuing to rely on a state-run 
system through a modified pay-as-you-go mechanism, nations such as 
Tajikistan force their citizens to make up for the deficit between cost of 
living and pension benefits.166 Alternatively, nations such as Kazakhstan 
provide a state-run system in the context of minimum guaranteed benefits, 
but the lack of reasonable alternatives results in many citizens struggling to 
survive off of this bare minimum.167 Politicians in these post-Soviet nations 
have failed to recognize that part of meaningful pension reform includes 
recognizing when private pension opportunities are inaccessible to the vast 
163 See Maltseva, supra note 147, at 291–92.
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number of citizens living in extreme poverty. A nation that crafts its pension 
system in a manner that just barely covers the majority, while enhancing 
opportunity for a slim minority, cannot possibly have sustainable success.
Yet there is also an inherent problem in attempting to split the 
difference and settle on policies that fall somewhere between state-run and 
privatized pensions. One of Russia’s major early failures occurred because 
citizens became comfortable with the government guaranteed pension and 
did not see the need or were not educated on how to access private pensions
and why investing in such pensions would be advantageous.168 Further, by 
continuing to cap investment in all securities except for government bonds, 
or by barring foreign investment, the Russian government has effectively 
rendered mandatory and voluntary pension funds equivalent. Finally, 
continued pay-as-you-go programs may serve an expedient political purpose, 
but these programs are incredibly out of place in a free-market context, 
where working individuals have tremendous incentive to evade paying into 
the system and funding their own retirements individually.
In many ways, Israel is years ahead of all the post-Soviet nations, both 
economically and the with respect to development of privatized pensions.
Still, Israel can learn critical lessons from the experiences of these post-
Soviet nations. Israel unquestionably set itself down the path of pension 
privatization with the enactment of the CFSIL that authorized and mandated 
the use of defined contribution plans. The Knesset has failed, however, to 
consider what steps are still necessary to assist older Israelis in the process 
of transitioning from defined benefit plans (that were capped in 1995) to 
defined contribution plans. As Russia learned, when citizens are given 
opportunities to achieve income replacement through private investment, but 
do not know how to do so, there is a substantial likelihood that those 
programs will not be accessed. The result of this knowledge gap will result
in a generation of Israelis who enter retirement age under the impression that 
their defined benefits will be waiting for them in full. 
As with the previously mentioned trend in post-Soviet nations, Israel’s 
government has attempted to function partially in state-run territory and 
partially in private territory. Israel must learn from the mistakes of these 
post-Soviet nations in not providing mechanisms for transferring all pension 
funds from older systems to newer systems. Regardless of whether the 
168 See Maltseva, supra note 147, at 305–10.
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initial program is a pay-as-you-go system or a defined benefit system, once 
expectations are settled, it is hard for pensioners to see the need to adapt 
their savings methods to new reforms. Israel has done little to foster the 
transition for older Israelis to private defined contribution investment, and
the consequences will be dire. Failure to enact this reform will result in an 
entire generation of Israelis unable to meet minimum costs of living, as has 
already occurred in many post-Soviet nations such as Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan.
Next, Israel must learn from Russia’s example and eliminate, or at 
least reduce, the 30% required investment in non-tradable government 
bonds. The imposition of these caps is a relic of state-run systems past and 
has no place in a modern privatized pension system. If the purpose of 
defined contribution systems is to shift investment risk to individuals, then 
governments should permit the free exercise of investment desires to permit 
accomplishment of income replacement on retirement. Capping private 
investment or requiring minimum investment in government bonds is 
problematic in two ways. First, it prevents private investors from accessing 
higher-risk, higher-yield securities, and second, it leaves pensioners 
dependent on the economic viability of the nation in their efforts to achieve 
income replacement. Fortunately for Israel, it has not experienced the same 
economic volatility of many post-Soviet nations. Given the political 
instability of the region, however, economic stability is by no means a 
guarantee. While eliminating the 30% requirement may expose some 
investors to greater risks, a well-regulated private pension system can 
address any issues caused by this exposure.
This in turn leads to the next lesson: private pension entities must be 
held accountable to pensioners, and not merely their shareholders. For this 
issue, it is important to return to the growing income inequality experienced 
in the South Caucasus Region and post-Soviet nations in Central Asia. As 
previously noted, these regions contain populations with a growing divide 
between the working class poor and the newly wealthy leaders of private 
industry. These private business owners are often able to eschew tax and 
regulatory provisions and are held to little account at the hands of the very 
parties they represent. The same is the case with private pension entities in 
Israel. At their core, these entities are profit-making ventures responsible 
primarily to shareholders and not pensioners. While pension regulatory 
agencies should not arbitrarily set caps on particular forms of investment, 
private entities should have some internal mechanism for ensuring that their 
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investment choices do not overly expose pensioners to unnecessary risk. 
The simplest solution is to require these entities to include pensioners on 
their management boards, and in turn, give those pensioners the opportunity 
to promote diversification of investment from within the entity.
Lastly, the Israeli government must learn from the lessons of post-
Soviet governments that failed to properly oversee the activities of their own 
pension administration agencies. In each of the previously discussed 
nations, the continued use of pay-as-you-go systems stemmed at least 
partially from the fact that the pension divisions of national governments 
continued to believe that these systems were economically feasible. By not 
requiring the CMISD to regularly report its activities to the Knesset, Israel’s 
pension policy will be subjected to the potentially erroneous assessments of 
the appointed agency heads. While some level of insulation can be 
beneficial so as to avoid stagnation at the hands of a public that has come to 
rely on a particular system, it also permits the kind of corruption and 
ignorance that plagues Russia’s system to this day. This is not to say that 
the Knesset ought to oversee all of the CMISD’s affairs. Rather, the agency 
should be compelled to regularly articulate its rationale for the way it 
enforces and regulates pension policy in Israel.
Some Israeli pension analysts may scoff at the notion that there is 
much to be learned from post-Soviet nations that have fallen behind other 
nations that transitioned to a free-market economy in the past century. Still, 
there are areas of weakness in Israel’s pension system that must be refined or 
Israeli citizens will face many of the consequences already experienced by 
post-Soviet nations. Israel’s Knesset should adopt refinements to existing 
pension laws to address failings that leave many elderly Israelis without true 
income replacement and also retain too many ties to the ghosts of Israel’s 
state-run pension system. The economic realities of Israelis are vastly 
different from citizens of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, or even Russia, but the 
relative results appear similar. Israel must learn these lessons from other 
formerly centralized economies or it will be doomed to repeat their mistakes.
VII. RECOMMENDED ISRAELI PENSION SYSTEM REFORMS
In the larger scheme of pension reform, Israel has taken many of the 
necessary steps to ensure long-term systemic viability and protection of 
individual pensioners. In certain areas, however, the policy decisions to 
retain elements of Israel’s socialist roots have potential to result in instability 
and insecurity for retiring Israelis. Five areas remain where greater reforms 
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are needed to fully accomplish the Knesset’s goals in enacting the
CFSIL. The sequence in which the Knesset should address these reforms
tracks the lifecycle of Israel’s history of pension reform.
The first step involves reexamining treatment of the remaining old 
pensions so as to ensure that Israelis who established defined benefit plans 
prior to the 1995 bar are adequately covered. Though the 2002 provisions 
that entered Government Resolution 5156 into force capped the 
government’s total contributions, it reduced neither the 4% interest accrued 
through government bonds, nor the guaranteed accrual of 2% of each 
member’s determinant earnings for the old pension plan.169 The determinant 
earnings are set as the average of the last three years of work or as an 
average of wages in the economy.170 As a result of combining a guaranteed 
accrual rate with a cap on government payments, pensioners who maintain 
defined benefit plans are at risk of realizing a benefit far less than what was 
promised by the determinant earnings formula.171
This concern has led many Israelis who held defined benefit plans to 
transfer their existing fund to privatized defined contribution plans. The 
problems involved with this transition are two-fold. First, the CMISD has 
not issued any guidance or regulations to standardize the process of moving 
funds from an old pension to a new pension fund.172 As a result, the 
reinvestment of these converted funds are made entirely at the discretion of
the management entity.173 Workers held old pension funds for many years,
which required fewer management decisions by the participant. As a result, 
these workers are less likely to have the requisite knowledge about their 
investment options. Consequently, transitioning old pensions to new 
pension funds without a standardized process might actually harm rather 
than help old-pension holders. Moreover, this transition exposes employees 
to greater risks because they will be forced to try and accrue investment 
gains in a shortened period of time (given their pension funds will likely be 
less substantial than those who invested in defined contribution plans from 
the start of their savings).
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Equally essential, steps must be taken to address employees who 
entered into defined benefit plans later in life, but shortly before the 
enactment of the 1995 bar on old pensions. Given the existence of many 
professions that were not covered by any pension plans in the early years of 
Israel’s statehood (for example, working on a kibbutz), it is not uncommon 
for an employee who is approaching the retirement age to have started 
saving for retirement just before the enactment of the 1995 bar.174 Even 
worse, when these workers are employed in the public sector, not all of their 
salary is insured for pension purposes.175 As a result, the 2% determinant 
accrual rate may only apply to a portion of the worker’s salary, with as much
as half of their salaries discounted for calculation purposes.176 In turn, 
elderly Israelis feel the need to work at higher rates than ever before, with 
work force participation for those between ages sixty-five and seventy-four 
increasing from 20% to 30% for men and 5% to 12% for women.177
The cumulative result of these issues is that the percentage of elderly 
Israelis living under the poverty line in terms of available post-retirement 
disposable income is among the highest of OECD nations at 20.7%.178 In 
comparison to other OECD nations that provide public pension wage-
replacement rates roughly equal to half of lifetime wages, Israel’s public 
system provides a rate of only 22%.179 Israeli citizens are stuck with little 
more than the initial promise of a defined benefit that was later capped by 
the government and lacks the flexibility to invest in high-yield (albeit 
riskier) investments. Still, during the period between 1997 and 2011, there 
was a moderate decline in elderly reliance on post-retirement age wage 
income, from 37% to 33%.180 This indicates that CSFIL reforms are, to an 
extent, accomplishing the Knesset’s stated goals. This figure also 
emphasizes the need for “catch-up” provisions that allow those who entered 
the workforce later in life to retire with replacement rates similar to those 
who were lifelong wage earners.181
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Second, the continued requirement that old and new pension funds 
invest a minimum of 30% of assets in non-tradable government bonds 
inhibits achievement of income replacement goals while distorting the 
pension market in favor of new pensions. This investment restriction
prevents retirement portfolio diversification by sacrificing actual pension 
fund growth in favor of the ephemeral mirage of stability. By limiting 
investment choice, Israeli pensioners are still largely prevented from 
investing in worldwide securities that could bring in significantly greater 
profits than the guaranteed 4% interest rate provided by government bonds.
A greater return on more diversified investments could mean more tax 
revenue for the Israeli government, but this benefit is sacrificed in favor of 
pension plan investment in government bonds. 
Further, by indexing the interest rate provided by these bonds to cost 
of living (rather than standard of living), many retiring Israelis find that their 
stable benefit is far below what is needed for true income replacement.182
Paradoxically, it is this same promise of 4% interest rates that overly 
incentivizes investment in new pensions rather than provident funds and life 
insurance policies.183 This in turn reduces system-wide diversification and 
places an undue burden on the Israeli government to eventually pay off the 
amount it borrowed from Israeli citizens in the form of these bonds. Should 
the Israeli economy face a prolonged period of stagnation at the same time a 
heightened number of Israelis are “cashing out” their bonds, the government 
may face the perfect storm of underfunding that it sought to avoid through 
passage of the CFSIL.
Third, while mandatory participation requirements help promote 
retirement savings for all Israelis,184 they may not be appropriate for low-
income citizens. At a general level, one of the largest benefits of retirement 
saving is that contributions to retirement plans enjoy tax-deferred status.185
This benefit, however, is not nearly as substantial for low-income earners as 
it is for higher-income pensioners.186 On retirement, these higher-income 
earners enjoy a drop in their marginal tax brackets because their retirement 
distributions tend to be lower than their working wages. This is not the case 
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for low-income earners who consistently pay the lowest marginal rate 
throughout their working and post-retirement lives, leading to a diminished 
tax-deferral benefit for these low-income earners.187 From a tax-benefit 
standpoint, Israel may need to reconsider whether mandatory retirement 
savings are justified for all Israelis.
These mandatory savings provisions are further called into question 
for low-income earners in terms of their need to balance lifetime 
consumption expenses with retirement savings. On the one hand, when 
combined with government entitlement programs, these mandatory savings 
requirements can result in post-retirement income replacement levels 
ranging from 140% to 150% for low-income earners.188 On the other hand, 
for low-income earners, this capital may be desperately needed to cover 
lifetime consumptive costs.189 Many low-income families around the world 
enjoy tax-benefits for two costs that are specifically problematic for Israelis: 
mortgage interest payments and childcare costs.190 Israelis cannot deduct 
mortgage interest in calculating their individual income taxes, while only 
women are able to take advantage of childcare credits.191 The lack of these 
tax-benefits makes it that much more essential for low-income Israelis to 
have access to disposable income during their lifetimes, rather than 
necessarily saving for retirement.192
Surely the arguments behind mandatory saving reflect the desire to 
ensure that all Israelis have post-retirement income, but such paternalistic 
savings requirements simultaneously inhibit the ability of low-income 
Israelis to cover pre-retirement lifetime expenses. As an alternative, tax-
incentives for retirement savings should be applied only to contributions 
made above this minimum required rate.193 In turn, these tax savings could 
be shifted to cover consumptive costs, including childcare expenses and 
mortgage interest payments that most heavily impact low-income Israelis.194
Alternatively, Israel could allow for low-income Israelis to postpone 
mandatory retirement contributions until years in which they are considered 
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higher-income earners.195 For those families who consistently fall into the 
category of low-income earners, the requirements could be modified to 
allow each wage earner in a family to contribute towards satisfaction of one 
minimum retirement pool, rather than imposing the same minimum on each 
family member independently.196 Underlying any changes to minimum 
participation requirements would be a reinforcement of government support, 
like social security, that continues to provide roughly one-third of Israeli 
post-retirement income.197
Fourth, despite the meaningful protections enacted by the 2001 
Insurance Control Law,198 Israeli pension management entities are private 
entities with a direct responsibility only to their shareholders. Their ability 
to generate profit for their shareholders depends on successful investment 
strategies, which may incentivize overly risky investments instead of slower, 
but more consistent, securities. As long as these private entities continue to 
exist without plan member representation on the governing boards, there is 
little reason to assume that riskier investment strategies will not be 
prioritized. Employers who serve as plan sponsors exert little sway over the 
decision-making of insurance entities, because the choice of entity is made 
entirely by the employee. The need for greater internal regulation of 
management decisions is underscored by the mixed results of Israeli courts 
in interpreting pension-related claims.199 Certainly a return to paternalistic 
government-sponsored management entities would be problematic, but the 
lack of participant representation on entity boards permits assumption of 
unnecessary investment risk, mismanagement, and leaving pension funds 
susceptible to fraudulent activities.
Finally, just as there is a lack of accountability for management 
entities, so too is the CMISD hardly held to account for its own decisions. 
Outside of the previously mentioned removal provisions for individual 
officers,200 the CMISD is not required to present any external reports on its 
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own performance to the Knesset.201 Though the CMISD is required to apply 
the Ministry of Finance’s internal controls, it is not required to develop its 
own plan for checking its performance prior to publication of legally binding 
circulars.202 To this point the CMISD has to a considerable degree worked 
to minimize the risks faced by pensioners, but the agency is imbued with
great authority that carries great potential for mismanagement if external 
controls are not brought to bear by the Knesset. For example, legislation in 
2005 gave the CMISD the authority to impose substantial fines and 
sanctions on management entities.203 Further, the CMISD is authorized to 
collaborate with the Israeli National Police and the Justice Department to 
pursue criminal investigations and sanctions for gross abuses by 
management entities.204 Though the CMISD regularly releases surveys of its 
activities,205 review of the agency’s civil-enforcement activities are left 
largely up to its own commissioner, not the Knesset.206 This leaves the 
commission vulnerable to political influences, industry pressure, and ill-
advised decision-making without consequence.
Considering the nearly insurmountable number of issues the pension 
system faced prior to enactment of several key reforms, these few items may 
seem to be of relatively little importance. Failure to address these items, 
however, could lead to disastrous results greater than the “focusing event”
that prompted earlier reforms in the first place. As a result, steps must be 
taken to clarify existing rules, cut ties to outdated socialist ideals, and 
increase the accountability of both private and government entities involved 
in the pension management process.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The comprehensive reforms implemented by the Control of Financial 
Services (Insurance) Law and subsequent regulations have resolved the 
majority of issues faced by Israel’s pension system. Four lingering issues
remain that must be addressed to see through this reform and ensure the 
protection of all Israeli pension plan participants. First, the CMISD must 
issue legally binding regulations to oversee the transfer of pension funds 
201 OECD REVIEW, supra note 44, at 14.
202 Id.
203 ISRAELI MINISTRY OF FINANCE, ACTIVITY OF THE CAPITAL MARKET, INSURANCE AND SAVINGS 
DIVISION 234 (2009).
204 Id. at 235.
205 Id. at 209.
206 Id. at 234.
APRIL 2016 DON’T COUNT YOUR NEST EGGS BEFORE THEY VEST 419
from old pensions to new pensions, and must create exceptions to the 
monetary cap on government contributions imposed by Government 
Resolution 5156 for workers who began saving in defined benefit plans late 
in life. Second, the CMISD must either eliminate or reduce the 30% 
requirement for investing in government bonds and permit a greater 
diversification of investment in both Israeli and worldwide securities. Third, 
pension insurance management entities must be required to include plan 
member representation on their governing boards, either through direct 
representation or incorporation of plan sponsors in the decision making 
process of these entities. Fourth, the CMISD must be held accountable 
through a requirement to regularly prepare external reports for review by the 
Knesset (and not only in times when an officer faces removal).
These changes may seem like minor refinements to the vast body of 
Israeli pension reforms, but as is often the case with protecting the post-
retirement incomes of employees, the devil is in the details. By enacting 
these reforms, the Israeli government can promote stability and protection, 
as well as profit in its oversight of both its public and private pension 
systems. Many of these lessons can be learned directly from post-Soviet 
nations that illustrate the problems wrought by leaving one foot in a socialist
system and placing the other in a privatized system. Israel should instead 
pursue a course where government involvement serves to protect the 
retirement investments of Israeli citizens, not one in which paternalistic 
policies restrict the ability of citizens to attain income replacement on 
retirement. A booming generation of Israelis is poised to retire in the 
coming decade, but many are counting their anticipated pensions based on 
outdated and unrealistic promises. The Knesset must promptly make these 
revisions to the existing pension system, or risk facing another underfunding 
crisis that threatens these pensioners’ futures.
